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Abstract 
This paper argues that the current calls for a practice turn in IR are, while positive in many 
respects, are problematic and potentially limiting because they are premised on: a confused 
understanding of the role of philosophy and realist philosophy in particular and a restricted 
view of the role of sociological investigation. This arises from the problematic tendency of to 
lapse into advocacy of an anti-realist philosophical and sociological imagination. We suggest 
that the problems that practice theorists point to should lead not to knee-jerk anti-realism but 
rather can motivate a reinvigorated conversation with realism. This entails revisiting the role 
of philosophy, realism and sociology in the study of practices. We argue that far from being 
antithetical to practice theory, a reconsideration of realist philosophy helps make sense of the 
role of practice and provides those advocating practice theory with better tools to deal with the 
challenges which motivated the development of these theoretical stances. Reconsidering 
realism entails, however, a reconsideration of a wider social ontology within which practice 
takes place, and openness to the role of philosophical and theoretical abstractions in teasing out 
the role of practice.  
 
Key words:  Practice theory, critical realism, scientific realism, Bourdieu, structure 
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Introduction 
 
In recent work there has been a growing momentum in favour of something called a practice 
turn in IR. This turn consists of various strands of theorising, ranging widely from advocates 
of pragmatist analysis to followers of Bourdieu and exponents of Actor Network Theory (ANT) 
and assemblages. However, despite the differences of orientation which characterise these 
strands of practice theory there are also common themes that motivate them.  Against 
FRQVWUXFWLYLVP¶VIRFXVRQµLQWHU-VXEMHFWLYH¶QRUPVDQGWKHobsessive concentration of many 
meta-WKHRULVWVRQµDEVWUDFW¶WKHRUHWLFDOTXHVWLRQVRIµVWUXFWXUHDQGDJHQF\¶SUDFWLFHWKHRULVWV
seek to reorient how we understand international politics. They ask us to focus on analysis of 
an aspect of international politics which often goes unnoticed and unappreciated within existing 
WKHRUHWLFDOSHUVSHFWLYHV7KHRULVWVVHHNLQJDµSUDFWLFHWXUQ¶DVNXVWRIRFXVRQDQDO\VLVRIZKDW
they call µpractices¶, often unconscious and habitual, DQGµEDFNJURXQGGLVSRVLWLRQV¶DFTXLUHG 
through practice (Pouliot 2008: 258).  
 
As Vincent Pouliot powerfully argues, a practice turn is deemed necessary because practice 
WKHRU\ LV XQLTXHO\ DEOH WR WDNH RQ ZKDW KH FDOOV WKH µUHSUHVHQWDWLRQDO ELDV¶ RI ,5 WKHRULHV
whether rational choice or FRQVWUXFWLYLVW7KLVELDVDULVHVIURPWKHDWWHPSWVWRH[SODLQµIURP
WKHRXWVLGH¶IURPDQDEVWUDFW*RG-OLNHµ,5WKHRUHWLFDO¶SRLQWRIYLHZWKHSDWWHUQVZHµVHH¶LQ
LQWHUQDWLRQDO SROLWLFV ZLWKRXW ILUVW VWXG\LQJ IURP WKH µJURXQG-XS¶ KRZ YDULRXV DJHQWV RI
international politics, its diplomats, its social movement activists, its bureaucrats, actually 
understand their world and act in it. An approach attentive to practice is necessary as it brings 
to our attention the practices of world political actors and thus also reveals the implicit forms 
RI µEDFNJURXQGNQRZOHGJH¶ HPEHGGHG LQ WKHLUSUDFWLFHV ,Q VRGRLQJSUDFWLFH WXUQ VHHNV WR
FRQWULEXWH WR ,5DQDO\VLVPRYLQJDZD\IURPµDUPFKDLUDQDO\VLV¶DQGFORVHU WRDFWXDOLWLHVRI
global political practice (Neumann cited in Pouliot, 2008: 259). 
 
3RXOLRW¶VPHWKRGRORJLFDOZRUNVSHFLILHGZKDWDPRUHVRFLRORJLFDOPRYHoffers to IR: 
movement away from abstract theorising in favour of attentiveness to practices in context. ANT 
WKHRULVWVZKLOHOHVVZLOOLQJWRXVHWKHWHUPµVRFLRORJ\¶itself considered an abstraction which 
DVVXPHV D VHSDUDWH µVRFLDO UHDOP¶ KDYH DOVR VSHFLILHG ZKDW D PRUH association-attuned 
approach would entail in IR including methodological tools for keeping researchers attuned to 
analysis of associations as we find them (Bueger, 2013). An implicit move to a sociological 
attitude is present here too, if only in the form of a critique of abstract IR theorising.  
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The call for more sociological knowledge in IR has also been captured in work arguing for 
better understandings of IR scholars and their social context. Inanna Hamati-Ataya¶V work 
(2012a, 2013) for example has provocatively called for a sociological turn in the analysis of 
knowledge construction in the IR discipline itself.  7KLVLVEHFDXVHµ,IZHDGRSWDQDEVWUDFW
understanding of theory that treats the theorist as operating over and above the world that she 
studies, then we cannot produce genuine social science of the kind that influences the conduct 
and practice of world pROLWLFV¶+DPDWL-Ataya, 2013).  
 
Similar interests have guided established approaches that reflect Wittgensteinian and 
pragmatist influences, particularly in their desire to situate everything within the realm of 
practices and practical knowledge. Recently reflecting on the strengths of the practice turn, 
Kratochwil argues that meaning is always constituted by links to other practices and not by any 
match between subject and object (Kratochwil 2011: 37). Indeed, he goes furthest of all 
practice theorists in claiming to reject philosophy itself on the grounds that it supposes a way 
that things really are (Kratochwil 2011: 45). While some forms of practice theory would appear 
to be sympathetic to philosophical argument, there is nevertheless a widespread scepticism 
towards conceptual abstraction beyond the realm of practices that is implicit in many of the 
arguments for the practice turn. We shall challenge such views from the perspective of critical 
realist philosophy. 
 
 
In this piece we approach practice theory - in the first instance practice theory associated with 
Bourdieu - from the perspective of critical realism in order to draw out three issues that are in 
need of further, and more nuanced, consideration among those interested in developing and 
applying practice theory ±philosophical argument and abstraction, conception of social 
structure and understanding of sociology of practices.  
 
Critical realism is located within the wider scientific or philosophical realist approach. We 
PDNHDFDVHKHUHIRUSKLORVRSKLFDODQGVFLHQWLILFUHDOLVPEXWEDVHRXUDUJXPHQWVIRUFODULW\¶V
sake, on the critical realist moves.1. This PHDQV WKDW ZH DFFHSW 5R\ %KDVNDU¶V SDUWLFXODU
                                                          
1 Terminological confusion is an ever-present difficulty in discussions of realist philosophy. In this article we 
make reference to philosophical realism, an umbrella term for various realist philosophies, scientific realism, 
WŽƵůŝŽƚ ?ƐĂŶĚƐŽŵĞŽƚŚĞƌƐ ?ĨĂǀŽured term for specific strands of philosophical realism which ground a 
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understanding of the role of philosophy, first and foremost, as an underlabourer to the sciences. 
This seeks to clarify the method of investigation, analysing conceptual claims, rendering 
explicit those assumptions that are often implicit, drawing attention to the ontological claims 
that lie behind these and, most generally, producing knowledge of the necessary conditions for 
the production of knowledge and practice of science (Bhaskar 1989: 8). We suggest that an 
engagement with critical realism enables us to show why practice matters as well as how. It 
can also help to establish a wider and more open approach to the otherwise very welcome 
µVRFLRORJLFDOWXUQ¶LQ,5We choose the critical realist variant of realism here because of its 
greater emphasis on the possibility of understanding something like social structure as well as 
its more radical understanding of the relationship between structures, practices and agents as a 
transformative and potentially HPDQFLSDWRU\ RQH :H DOVR ILQG PHULW LQ FULWLFDO UHDOLVP¶V
emphasis on depth ontology and social stratification which we find particularly useful in 
critiquing some of the claims of practice theory. These arguments of critical realism need not, 
however, lead to a wholesale rejection of the arguments of practice theory. To clarify, we argue 
here that the study of practices can be profitably dealt with within a realist, specifically critical 
realist, philosophical frame. We wish to argue that practice theorising need not insist, 
negatively, on the rejection of philosophical realism and various associated ontological claims, 
but can, and historically already has, fruitfully accommodated assumptions which push in 
different directions.  
 
We outline how critical realism can contribute positively to an understanding of practice and 
practice theory in three ways starting with a discussion of philosophy and the need for 
conceptual abstraction. If practice theorists rightly draw attention to the complex, messy and 
overlapping nature of social processes, then there is all the more need for careful abstraction 
and conceptualisation in order to identify the various components and influences and to 
consider how they combine and interact (Sayer 2000: 19). We advocate a critical realist 
approach in order to show how this can be done. 
 
 
Following this discussion the article moves to show how the problematic approach to 
abstraction leads to difficulties when it comes to the SUDFWLFHWXUQ¶VPRGe of addressing the 
                                                          
ƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚŝĐĂůůǇƌĞĂůŝƐƚƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶŽŶƐĐŝĞŶĐĞĂŶĚ ?ĐƌŝƚŝĐĂůƌĞĂůŝƐŵ ? ?ǁŚŝĐŚŝƐĂƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌƐƵď-type of philosophical 
and scientific realisms.  
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LVVXHRIKRZWRWKHRULVHµVRFLDOVWUXFWXUH¶In dealing with structure, we focus our discussion of 
VWUXFWXUHLQUHODWLRQWR3LHUUH%RXUGLHX¶VZRUNLQRUGHUWRSUREOHPDWL]HWKHUHODWLRQVKLSEHWZHHQ
structure, agency and practice. While rHFRJQLVLQJWKDW%RXUGLHX¶VZRUNLVQRWUHSUHVHQWDWLYHRI
the practice turn as a whole, we focus on it here both because of its current popularity in IR, 
and because we believe it offers significant opportunities for a realist reading and 
reconstruction. Also, while the insights we develop in this section arise from and directly relate 
to practice theory engagements with Bourdieu, we also claim that the misreadings of Bourdieu 
may offer wider cautionary tales for consideration by other practice theorists who might wish 
WRGRDZD\ZLWKDWWHPSWVWRWKHRULVHµVRFLDOVWUXFWXUH¶ 
 
Finally, we identify how the failures to adequately address philosophy, realism and abstraction 
LQIDFWIUXVWUDWHUDWKHUWKDQSURPRWHDµVRFLRORJLFDOWXUQ¶:HDUJXHWKDWFULWLTXHVRIrealism 
lead to a very specific and, in our view, limited sociology of practices. With a particular focus 
on the arguments of Bourdieu, but driven by a belief that these arguments can also speak to 
engagements with approaches like ANT, we suggest that a realist corrective, based on a wider 
and deeper social ontology, is not only possible but desirable as an alternative avenue through 
which to address the very issues that practice theorists were concerned with in initiating their 
theoretical interventions.  
 
Recognition of the positive contribution realism can make in debate on (limits of) practice 
theory is of importance in IR today because, as the practice turn has quickly become a leading 
new theoretical orientation to the study of International Relations, its consequences and 
implications for the study of IR are in danger of being misunderstood as a form of anti-realism 
and anti-(meta) theory. Practice theory is fast becoming the mainstream rival to constructivism, 
realism and liberalism and attracting students from various theoretical traditions, including 
poststructuralism, constructivism and postcolonialism and thus is likely to continue to shape 
the discipline of IR in the next two decades. According to Jorg Kustermans (2014) it makes 
three promises ± philosophically to overcome entrenched dualisms, theoretically to help 
account for change in world politics, and methodologically to account for politics as it actually 
occurs.  How we approach, reflect upon, teach and utilise this research tradition then is of 
crucial significance. This article is an attempt to demonstrate that the practice turn needs to be 
both celebrated and its empirical insights welcomed, but also that it can be fruitfully critically 
interrogated and reframed. Through such reframing we may be able to more sharply observe 
both the limitations of this tradition and the potential that exists to extend it and augment it. At 
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D PLQLPXP D FRQYHUVDWLRQ DQG D PRPHQW¶V UHIOHFWLRQ LV ZH KRSH DFKLHYHG WKURXJK
interpreting the insights of practice theory through a realist rather than an anti-realist lens. 
 
Practice theory, philosophy and abstraction 
 
Practice theory is a broad term. There are disputes about what it is and what it says. We agree 
with recent interventions that suggest that we need to distinguish, for example, between a more 
Aristotelian focus on praxis or action and a more Wittgensteinian focus on social rules and 
framework (Frost and Lechner 2015); or between a pragmatic approach focussed on action 
with fewer if any structural connotations, and a critical approach (usually drawing on Bourdieu) 
that embeds practice in power and hierarchies (Bueger and Gadinger 2015: 6-7). Recognising 
this diversity, we do not wish to suggest that all practice theorists make similar arguments. 
Indeed, we go on to indicate some significant divergences on issues to do with philosophy, 
realism and social structure. However, despite a lack of agreement on just what practices 
actually are and in what shared practice consists (Barnes 2001: 17), there are certain key 
orientations we can point to in practice theory.  
 
In one of the major works on practice theory, Theodore Schatzki argues that practice theorists 
are united in their concern with the way that phenomena such as knowledge and meaning, 
VFLHQFHSRZHUODQJXDJHDQGVRFLDOLQVWLWXWLRQVDUHDSDUWRIWKHµILHOGRISUDFWLFHV¶DQGWKDWWKH
central core of practices aUHµHPERGLHGPDWHULDOO\PHGLDWHGDUUD\VRIKXPDQDFWLYLW\FHQWUDOO\
RUJDQL]HGDURXQGVKDUHGSUDFWLFDOXQGHUVWDQGLQJ¶ 6FKDW]NL In so doing,  practice 
theory takes a materialist approach in seeing the VRFLDO DV D µILHOG RI HPERGLHG PDWHULDOO\
inWHUZRYHQ SUDFWLFHV FHQWUDOO\ RUJDQL]HG DURXQG VKDUHG SUDFWLFDO XQGHUVWDQGLQJV¶ 6FKDW]NL
2001: 3).  
 
These arguments are echoed in recent work by Bueger and Gadinger that considers the practice 
turn in IR. While noting the diversity of approaches being advocated, they identify core 
commonalities as: emphasis on process over stasis; development of an account of knowledge 
as action and the unity of doing and knowing; recognition of grasping knowledge as a collective 
process; advocacy of an approach that recognises non-human elements as part of practices; 
rejection of a single reality in favour of a multiplicity of orders; and acceptance of a 
performative understanding of the world (Bueger and Gadinger 2014: 19-20, 2015: 5). 
7 
 
 
In IR practice theory has been developed from different angles: from the perspectives of 
%RXUGLHXDQG/DWRXUDVZHOODVWKHµFODVVLFDO¶SUDJPDWLVWSHUVSHFWLYHs. While each comes with 
differences of orientation, partially fleshed out below, central to all has been questioning 
reliance on abstract notions such as µVFLHQWLILF PHWKRG¶ µLQWHU-VXEMHFWLYLW\¶ RU µDJHQF\ DQG
VWUXFWXUH¶LQFRQFUHWHH[SODQDWLRQVRILQWHUQDWLRQDOSROLWLFV7KLVLVSDUWO\EHFDXVHWKHVHWHUPV
SUREOHPDWLFDOO\µRULHQW¶RXUDQDO\VHVRIµSUDFWLFH¶,QVWHDGRIVLPSO\UHSOLFDWLQJWKHGLVFLSOLQH¶V
use of abstract terms and theoretical moves, practice theorists suggest that theorising practice 
in the absence of actual practices makes little sense. The practice turn at its base calls for a 
more sociologically attuned focus on actual practices of international relations policy-makers, 
practitioners and indeed scholars. As Kustermans notes, the focus is on the tangible and 
REVHUYDEOHWKHµFRPPRQSODFH¶WKHVXUIDFHDQGWKHRQWLFOHYHORIUHDOLW\µZKHUHWKHFommon 
VHQVHUHDOLVWGZHOOV¶2014: 191). Hence this focus is accompanied by a more sceptical attitude 
WR DEVWUDFW µWKHRU\¶ as well as, relatedly, metaphysical philosophical claims which specify 
µREMHFWV¶DEVWUDFWO\RXWVLGHRIFRQVLGHUDWLRQRISUDFWLFH. It is this sceptical attitude we wish to 
address here first, and the ways in which it can lead to a poor understanding of the role of 
philosophy, particularly as an underlabourer, and of realism as a philosophical approach to the 
social world. 
 
A potent example of an abstraction-wary practice theorist in IR is Vincent Pouliot and our 
critique of practice theory in this section focuses mainly on his arguments. His scepticism of 
general IR theoretical and philosophical frameworks is reflected in his rejection of the 
µHSLVWHPLF¶REVHVVLRQVRI:HVWHUQWKLQNHUV,WLVWKHWHQGHQF\WRDEVWUDFWDQGµORRNGRZQIURP
XSKLJK¶RQVRFLDOGHYHORSPHQWVWKDWLVSUREOHPDWLFDERXWHSLVWHPLFSUDFWLFHVµSURJUHVVLYHO\
the godlike posture of modern science, which looks at the world from above, triumphed over 
SUDFWLFDONQRZOHGJH¶3RXOLRW$VWKHµWRWDOLVLQJUHSUHVHQWDWLRQV¶RIPDSVGRQRW
µFRQYH\ WKH SUDFWLFDO RSHUDWLRQV WKDW PDGH WKHP SRVVLEOH¶ LQ WKH VDPH VHQVH ,5 WKHRULVWV¶
frameworks centered on epistemological cRQFHUQV DERXW µLQWHU-VXEMHFWLYLW\¶ RU µUDWLRQDO
FKRLFH¶EOLQGXVWRWKHSUDFWLFDOQDWXUHRIWKHDFWXDOZRUNLQJVRILQWHUQDWLRQDOSROLWLFV 
 
This is because abstractions lead to misreadings of what goes on in international politics, for 
µRQHFDQQRWLPSXWHWRSUDFWLWLRQHUV>RILQWHUQDWLRQDOSROLWLFV@DWKHRUHWLFDOSHUVSHFWLYH>DV,5
theorists tend to] that is made possible by looking at social aFWLRQEDFNZDUGVDQGIURPDERYH¶
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(Pouliot, 2008: 262). Theoretical and indeed philosophical categories and abstractions do not 
DOORZ URRP IRU µSURSHUO\ WKHRUL]LQJ SUDFWLFDO NQRZOHGJH¶ 3RXOLRW   7KXV IRU
example, abstractions such as agency and VWUXFWXUHDUHWREHUHWKRXJKWµ$JHQF\LVQRWVLPSO\
DERXWµGHI\LQJ¶VWUXFWXUHVE\PDNLQJFKRLFHVLQGHSHQGHQWO\RIWKHP,WLVFODLPHGWREHDPDWWHU
of instantiating structures, old and new, in and through practice. Without practice, 
intersubjective realities would falter; thus agency (or the enactment of practice) is what makes 
social reality possible in the first place¶ 3RXOLRW   3RVWPRGHUQLVWV DV PXFK DV
scientific realists are critiqued for not centring their analysis on practices but rather abstract 
notions of ontology, discourse or language games (Pouliot 2008: 265).  
 
For Pouliot, scientific realism is particularly prone to problematic tendencies to abstract, 
specifically through its insistence on the primacy of ontology and thus its insistence on the 
reality of objects of scientific study. Pouliot rejects as problematic (and dangerous) the idea of 
D µZRUOGEHIRUHNQRZOHGJH¶ DV LW µOHDGV WR UHLI\LQJRQH¶V FRPPRQVHQVLFDO DQGRU VFLHQWLILF
UHSUHVHQWDWLRQVDVQDWXUDODQGXQLYHUVDO¶ 3RXOLRW2007: 363). He also rejects as hubris the 
insistence by realists that our models are GHSLFWLQJµUHDOO\UHDO¶UHDOLWLHV6FLHQFHIRU3RXOLRWLV
QRW DERXW µdefining big-5 5HDOLW\¶ DV KLV SRVWIRXQGDWLRQDOLVW FRQVWUXFWLYLVP VHHNV WR
µSUREOHPDWL]HZKDW LVKHOG WREHUHDOE\ORRNLQJ LQWRWKHFRQVWLWXWLYHHIIHFWVRINQRZOHGJH¶
(2007: 363). A turn to a sociological analysis of actors needs to be prioritised over predilictions 
of (meta)theorists. 
 
The ANT approaches have a somewhat more complicated, yet not dissimilar orientations to 
sociology. The Latourian µ$FWRU-1HWZRUN7KHRU\¶ which has made notable inroads into IR 
(Bueger, 2014, 2; Bueger, 2013, Best and Walters, 2013, Nexon and Pouliot, 2013) draws on 
/DWRXU¶V (2005, 2010) analysis of scientific practices. IQVWHDGRIDVVXPLQJ µZHNQRZ¶ZKDW
actors are up to and that we can position, categorise and explain their actions and motivations 
RQWKHEDVLVRIVRFLDOVFLHQWLVWV¶DEVWUDFWWKHRULHVDQGFRQFHSWV/DWRXUVXJJHVWVZHQHHGWRSD\
attention to the associationVWKDWDFWRUVRUµDFWDQWV¶VRFLDODQGQDWXUDOKXPDQDQGQRQKXPDQ
DUHQHWZRUNHGLQ+HH[SOLFLWO\DUJXHVIRUDµIODWRQWRORJ\¶LQWKHVWXG\RIVRFLDOOLIH suggesting 
that this helps render the social world more clearly visible (2005: 16). This idea of visibility 
relates to an anti-abstraction position. Bueger and Gadinger (2014: 65) make this clear when 
they write that keeping ontology flat means reconceptualising the ideas that rely on 
construction of different levels and layers. This in IR means revisiting such things as system 
and unit, micro and macro and local and global. Instead of working with philosophical or 
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WKHRUHWLFDODEVWUDFWLRQVZKLFKFUHDWHLQRXULPDJLQDWLRQVµVRFLDOVWUXFWXUHV¶µVRFLDOUHODWLRQV¶
RULQGHHGDUHDOPRIµVRFLDOUHDOLW\¶Latour argues we should simply focus on what we observe 
and describe: the networks and interactions of things in them. This is crucial because for him 
the critical edge of social sciences has been lost because of social theorists¶ almost ideological 
commitmenW WR DEVWUDFW FDWHJRULHV RI H[SODQDWLRQ ZKLFK DUH LPSRVHG XSRQ WKH µREMHFWV¶ RI
analysis (Latour, 2004, 20107KHVHDEVWUDFWLRQVµUHSURGXFH¶IRUPVRIOLIHUDWKHUWKDQHQDEOLQJ
a critique of them. 
 
Here there is a scepticism even of the JORULILFDWLRQRIµVRFLRORJ\¶DVDQDQVZHU± for Latour 
(2005), for example, it could be said that µVRFLRORJ\¶LVSDUWRIWKHSUREOHPZLWKLWVµVRFLDO
WKHRUHWLFDO¶DEVWUDFWLRQV± \HWVLPLODUO\WRSUDFWLFHWKHRULVWVDFORVHUVWXG\RIDFWRUVLQµVRFLHW\¶
and µWKHZRUOG¶ZLWKRXWSKLORVRSKLFDOIRXQGDWLRQVDQGDEVWUDFWLRQVFDQKHOS. Christian Bueger 
perhaps more than most has sought to show what the implications of an ANT-perspective are. 
+HDFNQRZOHGJHVWKDW$17µVKDUHVPDQ\FRQFHUQVZLWKWKHSUDJPDWLVWDQGSUactice theoretical 
LGHDV¶DQG akin to them advisHVWKDWµUHVHDUFKHUV«VHHNSUR[LPLW\WRWKHSUDFWLFHVVWXGLHGWR
EXLOGWKHRU\IURPHPSLULFDOLQVLJKWVDQGWRUHWKLQNWKHFKDUDFWHURIUHSUHVHQWDWLRQ¶%XHJHU
2013: 338). He points out the futility of starting research by assuming philosophical dualities 
DVWKH\µFRPHDWDWRRKLJKSULFHDQGPLJKWSUHYHQWXVIURPXQGHUVWDQGLQJZKDWZHZDQWWR
NQRZ¶%XHJHUHe µHQFRXUDJHVXVWREXLOGQHZFRQFHSWXDODSSDUDWXVHVZKLFKGR
not rely on prior ontological FRPPLWPHQWV¶ %XHJHU   %XHJHU¶V DSSURDFK LV
consistent with the new interest in assemblage theory that draws on Latour and pragmatist 
philosophers as well as DeLanda and Deleuze and Guattari. In the first IR text to address this 
approach, Michele Acuto and Simon Curtis (2014) argue that it is possible to comprehend 
hybrids of different material, biological, social and technological components (assemblages) 
only by rejecting such reified general categories and abstract concepts like state, market, city, 
VRFLHW\DQGFDSLWDOLVP7KHVHDUHVHHQDVUHIOHFWLQJµPRGHUQLVW¶WKRXJKWUDWKHUWKDQKHOSLQJXV
to understand contemporary crises (Acuto and Curtis 2014: 2). 
 
These critiques are interesting for at the heart of them lies an important critique of µUHLI\LQJ¶
social theory which, instead of being puzzled by the world, too readily reaches for abstract 
philosophical solutions and concepts which then become moulds within which empirical 
observations are forced. We agree with this critique and thus the motivations for the turn to 
practice that informs the originators of practice theory, such as Bourdieu and Latour. Yet, we 
disagree with the view that in taking on these challenges it is a correct move to sidestep 
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abstraction and philosophical underlabouring as if these simply reflect µPRGHUQLVW WKRXJKW¶. 
Instead of lapsing into anti-realism, philosophical realism, if examined properly, can be of 
assistance to practice theorists in responding to these challenges.  
 
Revisiting realist philosophy 
 
Strangely, despite the fact that in general the move towards practice sociology has been 
DVVRFLDWHGZLWKQHZµPDWHULDOLVP¶(rather than the more idealistic linguistic and discourse 
analysis approaches of poststructuralists and constructivists), the current IR practice turn 
arguments do not address realism in any detail and when they do, actively reject, as 3RXOLRW¶V
comments for example showed, what is perceived DVµSKLORVRSKLFDO¶RUµscientific realism¶.  
By contrast, we start with the broader scientific realist position precisely because paradoxically 
it too starts with practice. Scientific realism, as a philosophy of science, argues that to 
understand the practices of scientists we need to understand their actions as being best 
explained as attempts to uncover the real mechanisms which underpin observable patterns 
(Bhaskar, 1975). It argues that the intelligibility of science presupposes that the world is 
structured in a certain way and that despite being mind-independent, it is open to investigation. 
Critical realism (Bhaskar, 1978) extends this realist understanding to the social sciences. It 
argues that the practice of social science is best understood as an effort to uncover social 
PHFKDQLVPVZKLFKDUHUHDOHYHQWKRXJKWKH\DUHQRWQHFHVVDULO\DVµVWDEOH¶RUFRQVLVWHQWLQ
their manifestations (due to the complexity of social intHUDFWLRQVLQµRSHQV\VWHPV¶DVWKRVH
REVHUYHGLQQDWXUDOVFLHQFHODERUDWRULHV%KDVNDU¶VFULWLFDOUHDOLVPFULWLTXHVSRVLWLYLVP and its 
vision of science head-on arguing that social science is not and cannot be seen as a search for 
observable regularities alone. But neither should we give up on causal analysis as postpositivist 
critics, aghast at positivist scientism, argue (Sayer, 2000; Kurki, 2008). Bhaskar argues we can 
build an epistemologically pluralist and ontologically realist middle way, which, while 
VHQVLWLYHWRµLQWHUSUHWLYLVP¶ and social construction, allows us to make judgements between 
accounts based on the belief that some of them are in principle more reality-congruent than 
others (although fixed criteria for discerning which are which are not readily available in social 
science). 
Scientific and critical realist positions have been introduced into IR by various scholars such 
as Colin Wight (2006), Alex Wendt (1999), Heikki Patomaki (2002), Jonathan Joseph (2007) 
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a critique of positivism in an analysis of scientific practice. They advocate postpositivism, but 
in a form that does not reduce social realities to language, norms or beliefs of individuals. They 
argue for recognition of theorisation and careful study of layered levels of reality making a 
distinction between the observed patterns and events and the unobservable causal structures. 
They argue importantly, for epistemological pluralism and methodological opportunism. In 
fact, contrary to poststructuralist or positivist philosophical perspectives, realism does not 
prescribe specific methods or epistemologies but leads us to accept that the questions we ask 
must direct the tools we use to answer these questions (Patomaki and Wight, 2001). On the one 
KDQG WKHUHIRUH FULWLFDO UHDOLVP DVVHVVHV WKHRULHV DQG PHWKRGV EDVHG RQ WKHLU µH[SODQDWRU\
DGHTXDF\¶RQWKHRWKHULWUHFRJQLVHVWKDWH[SODLQLQJWKHUHDOZRUOGUHTXLUHVDFHUWDLQGHJUHH
of abstraction and conceptualisation in order to get at the underlying structures and mechanisms 
of this complex reality. 
 
In this article we do not wish to rehearse the arguments revolving around philosophical, 
scientific and critical realism in general or in IR as these have been extensively covered 
elsewhere (see for example Joseph and Wight, 2010). What is of significance for us here is that 
realists argue for the need to theorise, that is conceptually abstract, in order to get at the 
unobservable causal mechanisms, forces and conditions which structure that which we 
empirically observe in VRFLDOUHDOLW\WKHVRFLDOZRUOGLVQRWµWUDQVSDUHQW¶WRXVDQGLQIDFWIRU
the most part consists of unobservable forces which need to be conceptualised, often in 
abstraction, in order to be understood. Conceptualisation is a necessary part of the scientific 
process that is required in order to trace signs of social norms, structures and beliefs in our 
empirical analyses.  
 
The practice turn has so far shunned this approach because  commitment to such realist 
philosophy would seem to HQWDLOµDEVWUDFWLRQ¶IURPWKHµFRQFUHWHSUDFWLFHV¶ZHDUHWREDVHRXU
analysis on, positing the existence of underlying, unobservable social relations, something that 
a flat ontology attempts to avoid or exclude. µPhilosophical¶ realism quickly becomes an 
anachronism for its (supposed) insistence on seemingly non-sociological grounds for 
philosophical claims about the underlying reality of natural and social kinds. Such prioritisation 
of conceptual DEVWUDFWLRQDQGXOWLPDWHO\DµSKLORVRSKLFDOSHUVSHFWLYH¶GRHVQRWHDVLO\ILWZLWKLQ
the perspective which foregrounds sociological analysis of practice. These tendencies towards 
being sceptical of philosophical realism do not exist in isolation in IR. It could be argued that 
they are part of a wider move against philosophy in the discipline (see e.g. 0RQWHLURDQG5XE\¶V
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[2009] critique of philosophical foundations, Sil and Katzenstein¶V >@ DQDO\WLFDO
eclecticism or LDNH¶V>@ anti-ismic position).  
 
Despite the prevalence of these sceptical tendencies in IR, we think it is important to consider 
further the wisdom of a position which reduces theorisation or philosophy of knowledge itself 
to the µVRFLRORJLFDO¶IRFXVRQµSUDFWLFH¶This is because the practice turn is weakened when it 
seeks to avoid reflection on philosophy and its relationship with sociology.  
 
Indeed, we would like to suggest that the relationship between philosophy and sociology is far 
more nuanced than many practice theorists allow for and we get a sense of this if we reconsider 
the insights of the critical realist position on knowledge production and the role of philosophy. 
Below, we seek to make two points critical of the current practice turn: 1) We point out that 
misunderstandings of realism FKDUDFWHULVHWKHµSUDFWLFH¶RIFULWLFLVPRISKLORVRSK\DQGUHDOLVP
2) We argue that if understood more accurately realism can, in fact, complement and add to 
practice theoretical attempts to develop a more µVRFLRORJLFDOLPDJLQDWLRQ¶LQ,5 
 
First, it is important to point out that realist philosophy has been significantly misunderstood 
by its critics. Pouliot in particular misrepresents what realism is. Contrary to what he implies, 
scientific or critical realism does not seek to argue that we have direct access to the world 
around us or that our models DUHµUHDOO\ UHDO¶)RU critical realists, our knowledge is just as 
VRFLDOO\FRQGLWLRQHGDQGVWUXFWXUHGDVLWLVIRUWKHµVRFLRORJLFDOO\¶LQFOLQHGPouliot, or indeed 
his inspiration, Bourdieu. However, where critical realists are closer to Bourdieu than they are 
to Pouliot is in their belief that, while we cannot have access to pure knowledge of society, 
EHFDXVHRXUDFFRXQWVDUHµRI¶VRPHWKLQJQRWDOORIWKHPDUHµHTXDO¶WRDQRWKHUDQGWKHUHDUH
strong grounds for exercising what Bhaskar calls judgmental rationality ± that is to say, in 
preferring one belief about something to another (Bhaskar 2009: 49). The philosophical move 
to ground practice of knowledge-production (or indeed the concrete practice of science for 
Bhaskar) on the assumption of ontological reality (to which we have no direct access) pre-
H[LVWLQJµRXUDFFRXQWV¶LVDNH\PRYHRQZKLFK%RXUGLHXwould arguably agree with realists 
rather than with 3RXOLRW%RXUGLHX¶VVRFLRORJ\DVZHGLVFXVVEHORZZDVDUJXDEO\JURXQGHG
not just in µSUDFWLFH¶DQGµVRFLRORJ\¶EXWµSKLORVRSKLFDO¶DFFHSWDQFHRIthe reality of practices 
and constructions they give ULVHWR3RXOLRW¶V attempt to address scientific realism would benefit 
from a more detailed reading of realism and a re-reading of Bourdieu in the more philosophical, 
UDWKHUWKDQPHUHO\µVRFLRORJLFDO¶YHLQ 
13 
 
 
ANT analysts similarly misjudge realism in adopting not just a philosophy-sceptical but a 
realism-VFHSWLFDO SRVLWLRQ /DWRXU FHUWDLQO\ LV VFHSWLFDO RI µSKLORVRSKLFDO¶ realism in that it 
HQWDLOVIRUKLPDFXULRXVVHWRITXHVWLRQVZK\ZRXOGZHDVNDERXWZKHWKHUµUHDOLW\¶H[LVWVLI
ZHGLGQRWWKLQNWKDWLQIDFWRXUµEUDLQVZHUHLQYDWV¶ZLWK VRPHVRUWRIDµUHDOLW\¶RXWVLGHLW 
(Latour, 1999: 4)? Refusing the inside/outside dichotomy Latour is not interested in abstract 
debates on reality, hence his efforts to flatten ontology and how we approach the world. Yet, 
Latour is not necessarily an anti-realist; he certainly works with empirical realism. Further, we 
DUJXHKHUHWKDWZLWKDQDGHTXDWHXQGHUVWDQGLQJRISKLORVRSKLFDOUHDOLVPLQKDQGHYHQ/DWRXU¶V
approach is not entirely incompatible with philosophical realism for ironically philosophical 
realism is in fact an approach that is directly trying to address the concerns he holds so dear: 
why do we end up reproducing the beliefs of subjects in our social theories? We argue that 
philosophical realism can help clarify concerns of interest to practice theorists. It also points to 
some important problems and contradictions in practice theory as it is currently conceived. 
 
One such clarification is recognition of the implicit role of philosophy in all social science. 
RealisWSKLORVRSK\¶V strength has arguably been to emphasise that even as social theorists think 
WKH\DUHFRPLQJWRWKHZRUOGµSXUH¶DQGµXQ-ZHLJKHG¶E\metaphysical systems, embedded in 
their thoughts, practices and knowledge are always, in fact, specific philosophical principles. 
7KHDVVXPSWLRQVRIµQDwYHHPSLULFLVP¶and even of more sophisticated empiricisms (whether 
positivist or post-positivist), need to be critiqued for denying that the process of knowing is 
guided by ontological and epistemological assumptions. Whether it is empiricist insistence on 
the objectivity of empirical observation or pragmatist insistence on practical knowledge, all 
positions, according to critical realists, are premised on specific philosophical systems for 
connecting knowledge, knowers and the world (Bhaskar, 1975). The benefits of a critical realist 
approach is that in acknowledging this and thus rendering these philosophical assumptions 
explicit, we can subject them to critical scrutiny. 
 
This criticism is important to keep in mind when considering the arguments made by practice 
turn advocates in IR. From a realist perspective we can observe that in the practice theoretical 
accounts are indeed embedded specific philosophicaO SULQFLSOHV HYHQ LI µSUDJPDWLVW¶ 
philosophical principlesZKLFKµLQIOXHQFH¶WKHLUUHDGLQJVRIµVRFLRORJ\¶DQGµSUDFWLFH¶:KLOH
keen to avoid a priori commitments, it may be that in so doing specific philosophical 
assumptions (whether on prioritisation of practical knowledge, pluralist epistemology, or 
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irrealist ontology) creep in. This is not all, for importantly realists point out that sometimes 
lack of reflection on ontology and epistemology results in theorists becoming inadvertently 
informed by problematic kinds of assumptions they have been seeking to avoid.  
 
One danger is that those positions that seek to avoid epistemological solutions often tend to 
µODSVH¶ LQWR QDLYH HPSLULFLVP While sceptical of the empiricism of positivist approaches, 
paradoxically, it could be argued that the prioritisation of sociology without philosophical 
IRXQGDWLRQVDOVRUXQVWKHULVNRIHPSLULFLVWDVVXPSWLRQVFUHHSLQJEDFNLQµ+RZGRZHNQRZ
ZKHQZHNQRZ"¶LVQRWDTXHVWLRQWKDWFDQEHVRFLRORJLFDOO\UHVROYHGEHFDXVHZHDUHDOUHDG\
µLQ¶NQRZOHGJHVWUXFWXUHV\HWLWLVDSUREOHm that can be attenuated by being conscious of the 
ontological and epistemological assumptions we bring to our knowledge (of knowledge). The 
NLQGVRIFKDOOHQJHV/DWRXU¶Vµcritique of critique¶ poses for social theory then can be addressed, 
in a different wD\WKURXJKDUHDOLVWFULWLTXHRIWKHFRQVHTXHQFHVRIKLVRZQµVROXWLRQ¶ 
 
Realists also bring to our attention the problems inherent in embracing a flat ontology. This is 
WR UHGXFH WKH ZRUOG µWKDW LV¶ WR µHYHQWV¶ µSUDFWLFHV¶ DQG WKXV WKH µREVHUYDEOH¶ DQd is 
characteristic of empiricism but also of many constructivist and postmodernist perspectives. 
This flat ontology leads to misunderstandings of causes and processes which do not exist at 
µREVHUYDEOH¶ OHYHOV RI UHDOLW\ $V %KDVNDU SXWV LW µ%\ VHFUHWLQJ an ontology based on the 
category of experience, the domains of reality (the domains of the real, the actual and the 
empirical) are collapsed into one. This prevents the crucial question of the conditions under 
which experience is, in fact, significant in sciencH IURP EHLQJ SRVHG¶ %KDVNDU 9: 15). 
Whether or not practice theorists perceive this as a positive thing, this flat ontology is a 
significant problem for their arguments. For example, it is difficult to make sense of things like 
habitus and background without some sense of ontological depth.  When focused on practice a 
WKHRULVWFDQEHFRPHXQLQWHUHVWHGLQDFWXDOO\WKHRULVLQJµDEVWUDFWLRQV¶ZKLFKZRXOGµH[SODLQ¶
practice and its conditions RISRVVLELOLW\DVVXFKWKH\UXQWKHULVNRIUHSURGXFLQJWKHDJHQWV¶
conceptions and, worse, fail to explain the structural contexts of practices./DWRXU¶VFKDOOHQJH
to social theorists is addressed again here, albeit differently, through a realist frame.  
 
There is a deeper reason to be concerned ± and one that practice turn theorists should be 
particularly concerned with. Philosophical foundations ± explicit or implicit ± have political 
and social origins and also implications. Latour (2004) in our view is right to argue that there 
PD\EHSUREOHPVWKDWDULVHIURPWKHODQJXDJHRIµVRFLDOVFLHQFH¶IRUVRFLDOVFLHQWLVWV¶DELOLW\WR
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critique societal tendencies. In this way a critique of social theory or philosophy of social 
science is political. Equally, a realist critique of flat ontology of individualism, for example, is 
far from apolitical: in enables and grounds critiques which emphasise social relations and non-
atomist (less liberal) imaginations. Much is politically at stake in being a realist, non-realist, or 
an anti-realist: yet, we are not sure these stakes are fully apparent, reflected on and dealt with 
in current debates. Certainly the limitations of realist philosophy can be reflected on but so can 
the consequences of standing against realism. Instead of hiding our philosophical or political 
commitments we here foreground an openly philosophically realist imagination of philosophy 
(and sociology) and one whose political openings and possibilities are openly available for 
discussion (see e.g. Kurki, 2009). In our view, while practice theorists are entitled to adopt 
pragmatism (where knowledge is defined as what works), this should be openly defended, 
considered for its philosophical implications, and the consequences reflected on, politically. 
Friedrichs and Kratochwil argue that pUDJPDWLVPLVVDLGWREHEHVWµDWWXQHG¶WRWKHSUDFWLFHWXUQ
in social ontology with the added benefit that it rejects Marxist notions like false consciousness 
(ibid., 713). However, as will become clear below, this is not the only interpretation of how to 
deal with practice and in fact sits uncomfortably with some of the founding figures of practice 
theorising. As we will see in the next section %RXUGLHX¶V concern with how people are 
practically engaged in the field (and the false understanding they might have of this 
relationship) is at odds with pragmatist arguments that knowledge is simply a product of social 
activity.  
 
'UDZLQJRQ%RXUGLHX¶VQRWLRQRIsocial structure 
 
As we have shown, the practice turn is critical of abstractions as a way of approaching the study 
of the world. Indeed, the practice turn might seem to some to be an easy means to avoid 
problems of abstract debates in IR, for example the abstract debate on structure versus agency. 
In this context importing Bourdieu into IR might be seen to be a way of adding a degree of 
sophistication to this debate JLYHQ %RXUGLHX¶V RZQ FRQFHUQ WR RYHUFRPH VXFK D GXDOLVP 
%RXUGLHX¶V, RU/DWRXU¶V, analytical frameworks might seem attractive in their opposition to the 
abstraction of concepts like structure and agency. Yet, to think we can avoid abstractions is a 
problematic way to come at theorising IR. Such approaches do not themselves escape 
abstractions ± DVZHVHHN WR VKRZKHUH WKURXJKDQDQDO\VLVRI ,5 WUHDWPHQWVRI%RXUGLHX¶V
DSSURDFK WR µVRFLDO VWUXFWXUH¶ ± but also in denying abstractions they weaken their 
FRQFHSWXDOLVDWLRQRIµVRFLDOIRUFHV¶.   
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We will raise two issues here. First, we suggest that in its treatment of questions of philosophy 
and abstraction, the turn to Bourdieu in IR practice theory, has lead to an instrumental 
DSSURSULDWLRQRI%RXUGLHX¶V work that interprets his arguments in either a shallow or selective 
way, specifically ignoring the significant UROHµDEVWUDFWLRQ¶SOD\HGLQKLVWKHRULVLQJ. Second, 
ZHDUJXHWKDWWKHUHDUHLQDGHTXDFLHVLQ%RXUGLHX¶VRZQDSSURDFKDQGVXJJHVWZD\VLQZKLFK
this can be better developed through adapting it to a realist social ontology. We focus here on 
the concept of structure because of its importance DVDQµDEVWUDFW¶FRQFHSWnot only in the IR 
field and for critical realists but because of the problematic ways in which it has surfaced and 
continues to surface in practice turn analysis in IR. 7KLV LVQRW WRVD\WKDWµVRFLDOVWUXFWXUH¶
should necessarily be the main way to understand the social world from a realist perspective, 
but it is to say that such abstraction which gets at the ontology beyond practice is absolutely 
necessary. As we will show, at the heart of many of the problems with current practice theory 
is the inability to adequately abstract, and thus conceptualise, µstructure¶RUZKDWHYHUZHZRXOG
call underlying social context) due to a shallow or surface ontology and an inadequate 
XQGHUVWDQGLQJRIWKHUROHRIµSKLORVRSKLFDO¶DUJXPHQWVDERXWVRFLDORQWRORJ\ 
 
Recent works by Vincent Pouliot (2007, 2008), Emanual Adler (Adler and Pouliot 2011) and 
Ted Hopf (2010) provide good examples of an inconsistent approach to Bourdieu and to the 
TXHVWLRQRIVWUXFWXUHLQSDUWLFXODU0RVWRIWKHWLPHWKLVZRUNPDLQWDLQVWKHNLQGRIµpractice 
FRQVWUXFWLYLVW¶ RQWRORJ\ WKDW SODFHV LWV HPSKDVis on social practices and background 
knowledge. As we shall see below, there is occasionally a promising notion of structure that 
seems to be lurking in these ontologies. Yet such lurking conceptions of structure would seem 
to be inconsistent with the anti-realist stance present in much of this work and so is never 
properly elaborated into a coherent position. More common is a position that rejects the idea 
that structure has any meaningful existence in and of itself, and which conflates structure with 
its practical instantiation. This is what links these authors to the likes of Wittgenstein, Searle, 
Giddens and other variations of constructivism. Other approaches like Rebecca Adler-1LVVHQ¶V
GUDZRQ%RXUGLHXEXWVHHNWRFRXQWHUKLVµWHQGHQF\WRZDUGVVWUXFWXUDOLVP¶ LQWKLVFDVHE\
using the symbolic interactionism of Goffman to place stress on role-playing, stigma 
management and face-work (Adler-Nissen 2014: 18). Drawing on critical realism, we wish to 
VKRZKHUHZK\LWLVXQQHFHVVDU\WRWU\WRµDYRLG¶VWructuralism in such positions.  
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An initial definition of practice given by Adler and Pouliot in an influential recent article 
typifies the weak approach to structure and practice that we are criticising here. Practices, they 
claim, are competent performances and socially meaningful patterns of action (Adler and 
Pouliot 2011: 4). This notion owes little to Bourdieu but, like Adler-1LVVHQ¶V work draws from 
Goffman, particularly, the emphasis on practice as socially meaningful and recognisable 
competence or performance (Adler and Pouliot 2011: 6). This is some distance from the 
Bourdieusian notion of practice. The idea of practice as resting on background knowledge is 
closer to Bourdieu but is not distinctively Bourdieusian and indeed the authors mention 
Wittgenstein at this point in their argument (ibid., 7). 
 
These initial suggestions lead us to express a degree of confusion when we find the notion of 
social structure emerging elsewhere LQ$GOHUDQG3RXOLRW¶VDUJXPHQW(DUO\RQWKH\PHQWLRQ
the material and ideational processes that enable structures to stabilise or evolve and they talk, 
just like critical realists, of how agents may reproduce or transform structures (ibid., 5). We 
ODWHUILQGDVWURQJO\DSSHDOLQJDUJXPHQWWKDWµSUDFWLFHVVWDELOL]HVRFLDOVWUXFWXUHVDQGIL[LGHDV
RUVXEMHFWLYLWLHVLQSHRSOH¶VPLQGV¶LELGThis is appealing to us because it differentiates 
between practices and structures and conceives of practices as positioned in relation to 
structures as well as activities. The realist position, to clarify, argues that practices are socially 
meaningful activities, but that this meaningfulness depends upon their relation to the 
reproduction and transformation of underlying social structures and generative mechanisms. 
 
Elsewhere, in discussing the practices of the international system, Adler and Pouliot mention 
the processes by which both social structures and social subjectivities are constituted by 
practices (ibid., 22). This might be compared with the critical realism of Bob Jessop and Ngai-
Ling Sum who, in outlining an approach they call cultural political economy, argue that 
practices are oriented to economic structures or systems, but that these are semiotically, 
organisationally and institutionally fixed as appropriate objects of intervention (Sum and 
Jessop 2013: 166). The problem in Adler and PoulLRW¶VDFFRXQWKRZHYHUis that at no point is 
it made clear exactly what the notion of structure is referring to; it remains an unclear, 
unsystematic and unreflexive notion. Our suspicion is that structure remains in their argument 
as a consequence of their use of Bourdieu and perhaps as a result of a difference of emphasis 
between the authors, but that it has very little actual meaning. Indeed, in their critique of 
DEVWUDFWVWUXFWXUHVDSKLORVRSKLFDOSRVLWLRQRQZKDWVWUXFWXUHµPHDQV¶LVHOLGHG 
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While we may have some disagreement with his conception of structure, in contrast to the IR 
theorists, Bourdieu gives the notion of structure a more meaningful content, talking about such 
things as economic structures, kinship relations and linguistics. Elsewhere he gives further 
examples of what he means by structures, while emphasising the need for a science of those 
structures that govern social practices:  
 
the prerequisite for a science of common sense representations which seeks to be more 
than a complicitous description is a science of the structures which govern both practices 
and the concomitant representations, the latter being principal obstacle to the construction  
of such a science. Only by constructing the objective structures (price curves, chances of 
access to higher education, laws of the matrimonial market, etc.) is one able to pose the 
question of the mechanisms through which the relationship is established between the 
structures and practices or the representations which accompany them (Bourdieu 1977: 
21) 
 
This is clearly an account of the relation between structures and practices that requires us to 
PDNHDVLJQLILFDQWRQWRORJLFDOGLVWLQFWLRQ0RUHRYHU%RXUGLHX¶VFRQFHSWVRIILHOGDQGKDELWXV
can only be understood by keeping structures very much to the fore. To quote again from 
%RXUGLHX µ7KHVH SUDFWLFHV FDQ EH DFFRXQWHG IRU RQO\ E\ UHODWLQJ WKH REMHFWLYH structure 
defining the social conditions of the production of the habitus which engendered them to the 
conditions in which habitus iVRSHUDWLQJ¶ 
 
Advocates of the practice turn might want to suggest that what this points to is not the kind of 
notion of social structure envisaged by critical realists, but simply the notion of field as 
background context. This could be given a deep hermeneutic basis as Hopf does in talking of 
the deep structure of our taken-for granted lifeworld (Hopf 2010: 554). This is a point worth 
discussing and it is not our aim here to claim that there is a consistently realist notion of social 
structure SUHVHQWDFURVVWKHYDVWUDQJHRI%RXUGLHX¶VZRUN+RZHYHUZHGRIHHOWKDWLWLVHDV\
to find, at the very least, a structural notion of field that would be consistent with a more realist 
approach and that this understanding is superior to the social ontology offered by the practice 
turn theoristsLQZKLFKWKHPHDQLQJRIWKHµDEVWUDFW¶WHUPUHPDLQVHPSW\DQGSKLORVRSKLFDOO\
unexplored/unjustified.  
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At this point we should emphasise to the reader what is emerging as a central issue to us. 
Contrary to whatHYHUWKHµSUDFWLFHWXUQ¶LVPHDQWWRLPSO\IRURXUUHVHDUFKIRFXV, in our view 
DNH\SRLQWRI%RXUGLHX¶VRZQUHVHDUFKSURJUDPPHLVWRKLJKOLJKWWKHlimits of practice. This 
includes the limits of practical knowledge and consciousness. 
 
Hence, we would argue that consistent with our views on realism, it is impossible to fully 
DSSUHFLDWHVRPHRI%RXUGLHX¶VNH\QRWLRQVZLWKRXWUHFRJQLVLQJWKHREMHFWLYHRUUHDOQDWXUHRI
social structures which is required in order to explain misrecognition, habitual reproduction 
DQG WKH ODUJHO\XQFRQVFLRXVQDWXUHRIKDELWXV%RXUGLHX WDONVRISUDFWLFDO WD[RQRPLHVDV µD
WUDQVIRUPHGPLVUHFRJQL]DEOHIRUPRIWKHUHDOGLYLVLRQVRIWKHVRFLDORUGHU«>WKDW@FRQWULEXWH
to the reproduction of that order by producing objectively orchestrated practices (Bourdieu 
1977: 163). This makes the realist point that such practices produce misrecognition of a real 
VLWXDWLRQ$QGUDWKHUWKDQEHLQJDµWXUQ¶WRSUDFWLFHDQGDJHQF\LWUHIOHFWVDFHQWUDOFRQFHUQ
with their social or structural constraints, which in turn implies abstraction, which thus leads 
to the need to at least consider the attractions of a µphilosophically¶ UHDOLVW UDWKHUWKDQµIODW
UHDOLVWHPSLULFLVW¶UHDVRQLQJRQORJLFRIH[SODQDWLRQWKURXJKSUDFWLFH.  
 
%RXUGLHX¶VHPSKDVLVRQ limited understanding, unconscious reproduction and misrecognition 
is consistent with the realist idea that social practices and habitus act as the means of mediation 
between structures and agents. It is through the unreflective practice or limited consciousness 
of agents in their routine activities that objective social structures are reproduced. Rather than 
rejecting the structure-agency relationship, this approach to practices highlights the nature of 
their relationship as well as suggesting that practiFHVDUHµSRVLWLRQHG¶ RUµRULHQWHG¶ in a certain 
ZD\7KLVLVQRWHGIRUH[DPSOHLQ:LJKW¶VWUHDWPHQWRI%RXUGLHXZKHUHDKDELWXVRISRVLWLRQHG
practices is a mediating link between agents and the socio-cultural world that they share (Wight 
2006: 49). This LQWXUQFRPHVIURP%KDVNDU¶VDUJXPHQWWKDWZHQHHGWRXQGHUVWDQGWKHµSRLQW
RIFRQWDFW¶EHWZHHQKXPDQDJHQF\DQGVRFLDOVWUXFWXUHVE\H[DPLQLQJDPHGLDWLQJV\VWHPRI
positions ± places, functions, rules, tasks, duties, etc., and practices, activities etc., which are 
HQJDJHGLQE\YLUWXHRIDJHQWV¶RFFXSDQF\RIVRFLDOSRVLWLRQV&UXFLDOO\WKLVSRVLWLRQ-practice 
system is to be understood relationally (Bhaskar 1989: 40-1). 
 
,Q RXU YLHZ WKHUH DUH VLJQLILFDQW DUJXPHQWV LQ %RXUGLHX¶V ZRUN WKDW VXSSRUW WKH NLQG of 
relational approach favoured by approaches such as critical realism. Bourdieu argues that what 
exists in the social world are relations, not interactions between agents or intersubjective ties 
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between individuals, but objective relations that exist, as Marx says, independent of 
consciousness. That is, whether you call social structure a social structure, there is something 
beyond the practices which orients actors and it is this relational orientation which social 
VWUXFWXUH DV DQ DEVWUDFWLRQ WULHV WR µJHW DW¶ ZKHWKHU LW GRHV VR ZHOO LV DQRWKHU TXHVWLRQ
Crucially, the wider context is important: for Bourdieu it is provided by the notion of social 
field which is defined as a network of objective relations between positions (Bourdieu and 
Wacquant 1992: 97).  
 
We pose this reading in strong contrast to that of Hamati-Ataya who FODLPVWKDWµ³ILHOG´DQG
³KDELWXV´VLJQLI\%RXUGLHX¶VUHMHFWLRQRIWKHFRQFHSWVRI³VWUXFWXUH´ DQG³DJHQF\´¶:HDOVR 
reject her Giddensian conflation of field and habitus where she writes, as a constructivist 
would, tKDW µILHOG DQG KDELWXV DUH mutually constitutive and therefore impossible to 
FRQFHSWXDOLVHRUREMHFWLYDWH LQGHSHQGHQWO\RIHDFKRWKHU¶ +DPDWL-Ataya 2012a: 631). This 
represents the common problem of conflating problems of definition with the actual properties 
RIWKHHQWLWLHVWKHPVHOYHV,QDFWXDOLW\LWLVFOHDUIURP%RXUGLHX¶VZRUNWKDWILHOGDQGhabitus 
are seen as ontologically distinct, with different properties and causal effects. Hence Bourdieu 
argues that their relationship is a conditioned one. The field structures the habitus. The habitus 
is a product of the immanent necessity of a field. Habitus contributes to the constitution of the 
field as a meaningful world (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992: 127). It seems odd to waste such a 
useful set of distinctions by using the somewhat ubiquitous constructivist description of 
µPXWXDOFRQVWLWXWLRQ¶Abstractions, whatever they are, should assist in explaining. Rather than 
EHLQJ µFHQWUDOO\ FRQIODWHG¶ (Archer 1995), within a realist frame the relationship between 
practices and their context can be seen through a process where antecedently existing relations 
constrain and enable agents who operate through a system of mediating positioned practices. 
 
Such an approach, we believe, is, while not of course the final answer to theorising social 
practices, a more consistent and helpful approach in accounting for and delineating the context 
of practices. It relies on abstractions, but so do, in fact, practice theory accounts. We, and we 
think Bourdieu also, find these abstractions helpful in giving a sense of what practice does and 
how it does it ZLWKRXWµIODWWHQLQJ¶HYHU\WKLQJWRSUDFWLFHVWRWKHSRLQWZKHUHQRWKLQJH[SODLQV
anything else and where practice starts to become an empty term. The problem with avoiding 
philosophical realism and abstraction is that it can drive a practice theorists not only to a 
dismissal of reasonable realist claims about underlying causes and conditions of possibility, 
21 
 
which would complement their vision, but also, as we argue in the next section, move them in 
the direction of a limited sociological vision. 
 
A limited conception of sociology 
 
 
We have argued here that the introduction of practice theory into IR tends to ignore some of 
the problematic philosophical basis of its theorising and tends to shun or even misread realism. 
Certainly, there is a tendency to ignore the rather complicated equivocations on the question of 
realism and abstraction of Bourdieu (and Latour (2010, ch 1); and their differences on these 
questions (Bourdieu 2004: 28),). As the latter part of this article has shown, closely reading 
and engaging with the realist tendencies in practice theory (we focused here on Bourdieu) 
reveals openings to philosophical realism. We argue here that practice turn scholars could 
benefit from open and perhaps even disputatious engagement with realism, abstraction and 
philosophy. Ultimately, we think that this is necessary because the arguments against certain 
philosophical and realist arguments also lead to a problematic approach to sociology.  
 
We have seen that the practice turn attempts to implement a sociological turn of sorts ± but, it 
seems to us, it tends to advocate a limited sociology of actors and their experiences rather than 
a sociology that genuinely concerns itself with understanding the wider social field.. Hostility 
to philosophical claims about the underlying nature of the social world means that, like 
positivism, practice theory informed by anti-realism is unable to conceptualise things beyond 
what is observable in practice and is thus trapped in an insider view of the µfield¶ that is 
remarkably unreflective about how the field itself might be constituted by anything other than 
the agents directly involved.  
The consequences of this are particularly problematic to us from an IR perspective because it 
seems odd to talk about, for example, IR as a field without seeing that field as being heavily 
shaped by such things as its proximity to US structural hegemony or global capitalism. Critical 
realists like Andrew Collier (1989) would understand this in terms of µWZRRXWVLGHV¶RQHEHLQJ
WKH LQWUDQVLWLYH ZRUOG WKDW WKHRULHV VHHN WR XQGHUVWDQG DQG WKH RWKHU µRXWVLGH¶ EHLQJ WKH
transitive practices of knowledge acquisition with their associated schools, institutions,  
networks and practices. Practice theorists would of course talk about US hegemony and global 
capitalism but they would reduce these to their instantiation in the practices of the 
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µDXWRQRPRXV¶ILHOGUDWKHUWKDQVHHLQJWKHPDVDWOHDVWSDUWO\FRQVWLWXWLYHRIWKHILHOGLWVHOIIn 
an interesting argument Trine Villumsen Berling (2013) notes how the realist school in IR 
developed alongside NATO practices of balance of power and technical military integration. 
While this is true, the explanation only goes so far.  
By contrast, we see structural hegemony and global capitalism primarily in terms of social 
structure that orients practice rather than as social practice per se. This is clearly in opposition 
WRSUDFWLFHWKHRULVWVDVZHOODVFRQVWUXFWLYLVWVZKRFRQIODWHWKHWZRDVLVHYLGHQWLQ3RXOLRW¶V
assertion of the ontological priority of the logic of practicality in relation to the mutually 
constitutive dynamics between agency and structure (Pouliot 2008: 259). It is also opposed to 
attempts to resolve the positioning of practice by recourse to other practices. Such is the case 
LQ6HQGLQJDQG1HXPDQQ¶VFODLPWKDWWKHUHDUHFHUWDLQµDQFKRULQJSUDFWLFHV¶WKDWUHQGHURWKHU
practices possible (2011: 237). When they argue for a view of international organisations as a 
series of practices with some anchoring of others, we are entitled to ask, what anchors 
international organisations themselves? 7KHVHLVVXHVJREDFNWR$QQ6ZLGOHU¶VGLVFXVVLRQRI
cultural practices where she suggests that anchoring practices constitute socially negotiated 
realities that coordinaWH EDVLF VRFLDO UHODWLRQVKLSV 6KH WDONV RI VRPH µVWUXFWXUHV¶ OLNH
capitalism) as deeper and more fundamental and powerful than other practices, but then goes 
RQWRGHILQHWKHVHVWUXFWXUHVDV µFRQVWLWXWLYHUXOHV¶RIZKLFKZHKDYHOHVVGLUHFWNQRZOHGJH
(Swidler 2001: 81-6). 
In contrast to these conflationist approaches, Bourdieu too offers an argument IRUDVFLHQFHµRI
the dialectical relations between the objective structures to which the objectivist mode of 
knowledge gives access and the structured dispositions within which those structures are 
DFWXDOL]HGDQGZKLFKWHQGWRUHSURGXFHWKHP¶:HDJUHHZLWKWKLVDVDQRQWRORJLFDO
statement (i.e. that there is an ontological distinction between objective structures and 
structured dispositions) but we disagree with the epistemological characterisation of 
objectivism as a mode of knowledge. Indeed, we question the claim that the objectivist mode 
of knowledge does actually give access to objective structures. This is because Bourdieu 
conceives of objectivism as somewhat similar to what we would call positivism. Elsewhere 
Bourdieu talks of objectivism as something that establishes objective regularities. This is his 
understanding of such things as structures, laws and systems of relationships that are 
independent of individual consciousness (1990: 26). 
 
A lot depends on how we understand structures (and indeed perhaps this is not the most useful 
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ZD\WRWKHRULVHµFRQWH[W¶RISUDFWLFHVEXWLI there is a SUREOHPLQ%RXUGLHX¶VZRUNLWVHHPVWR
us that it lies in the fact that he equates structures with the objectivist identification of them ± 
an epistemic fallacy that equates real things with the knowledge we have of them.  In fact we 
would advocate a more relational approach than Bourdieu insofar as he appears to identify 
objective structures with the positivist identification of empirical regularities whereas we 
maintain that structures are social relations or orientations. In short, we believe in objective 
social structuresRUµILHOGV¶EH\RQGµSUDFWLFHV¶ while recognising that these are relational in 
character. They are not reducible to regularities or patterns of behaviour or events. They have 
an existence independent of the agents who act within them. They have an underlying and often 
unobservable character. And they condition, and are revealed in, the more concrete practices 
that contemporary IR theorists seem so keen to foreground. 
 
:H WKXV IROORZ :LOOLDP &DUUROO LQ EULQJLQJ WRJHWKHU UHDOLVW DUJXPHQWV DQG %RXUGLHX¶V
arguments about social fields. Realism addresses the problem of the disciplinary fields not by 
developing sociologies µof the field¶ but by developing an integrated non-reductionist science 
of humanity as a whole ,I WKHUH LVDJRRG UHDVRQIRUD µVRFLRORJLFDO WXUQ¶ LW LVQRWEHFDXVH
µVRFLRORJ\¶ will somehow help to explain what is going on in IR but because sociology is the 
best way to understand the world. And this, as Carroll ironically notes, is not because sociology 
represents a strong or coherent discipline but to the contrary, its virtue resides in its broad 
scope, porous boundaries and unsettled character all of which can help to undermine the 
µHQFORVXUHV¶ RI GLVFLSOLQDU\ VRFLDO VFLHQFH &DUUROO   A broad, non-disciplinary, 
speculative and conceptually open and flexible sociology benefitting from realist philosophical 
insights is not antithetical to, although it develops in a distinct direction, the vision of social 
analysis of Bourdieu. It is this vision of sociology we wish to foreground. 
 
This leads us to take stock of the contribution critical realism can make to practice theory. 
Rather than limiting philosophy to its relationship to practices, we argued that critical realism 
takes on board the need to make claims through abstractions about a wider and deeper reality. 
The below table clarifies the position we defend. In sum, we propose a philosophically realist 
form of practice theory which pays attention to the role of abstraction, the limits of flat 
ontology, the need to grapple with structures (unobservable as they are) and unintended 
consequences they can generate, and thus a wider view of sociology which is attuned not only 
practice but also the limits of practice. 
 
24 
 
Practice view Realist view Combination 
Philosophy linked to the 
practice-knowledge-action 
relationship 
Philosophy as both an 
underlabourer and maker of 
metaphysical claims 
Philosophy has a wide-ranging 
role based on ontological 
realism, epistemological 
relativism and judgmental 
rationalism 
Rejection of conceptual / 
philosophical abstraction 
Need for conceptual 
abstraction and metaphysical 
arguments 
Practice theory gets at the 
empirics of how practices work 
while realism gets at 
underlying causal mechanisms 
and conditions of possibility  
Flat ontology Stratified depth ontology Combination is not possible. 
Flat ontology should be 
rejected in favour of a 
stratified depth ontology that 
includes practices as a central 
part. 
Practice-based ontology Structure-agency question Ontology of structure-practice-
agent with particular 
importance given to the 
process of social reproduction 
as well as unintended 
consequences 
Wary of ontological claims Ontological claims about 
nature of reality 
Need ontological claims to 
situate practices and our 
understanding of them 
Table 1. 
 
Conclusion 
As Cornelia Navari (2011) notes, the notion of practice lies in the middle ground between more 
individualistic approaches and more holistic structural explanations. There is no reason to think 
that we have to choose between such options, but rather, the issue is where to place the 
emphasis. A critical realist approach helps insofar as it can see the distinctiveness of each aspect 
RIWKHUHODWLRQVKLSEHWZHHQVWUXFWXUHSUDFWLFHVDQGDJHQWV7RSXWLWLQ1DYDUL¶VWHUPVVRFLDO
structures, although conceived of by us as underlying, are not to be understood separately from 
WKHDJHQWV¶SDUWLFLSDWLRQLQWKHP)XUWKHUPRUHZHFDQDJUHHZLWK-anice Bially Mattern (2011) 
WKDWµ:KLOHVWUXFWXUHLVQHFHVVDU\IRUWKHHPHUJHQFHRISUDFWLFHSUDFWLFHGRHVZKDWVWUXFture 
FDQQRWLWJHQHUDWHVKXPDQEHLQJ¶DQGWKDWµZKLOHSUDFWLFHFUHDWHVDJHQF\DJHQF\GRHVZKDW
SUDFWLFHFDQQRWLWWUDQVIRUPVSUDFWLFH¶2011: 75). We agree with Bially Mattern that social 
structures cannot be understood separately IURPWKHDJHQWV¶SDUWLcipation in them (2011: 618), 
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a point also made by Bhaskar (1989)2+RZHYHUZHDOVRIROORZ1DYDUL¶VXQGHUVWDQGLQJRID
more structuralist position as identified in %RXUGLHX¶VDWWHPSWWRILQGµan anchor in which to 
ground habitual behaviour¶2011: 263) 
 
This article argues that there are limitations to the approaches to IR which prioritise practice. 
These limitations are partly philosophical and partly analytical but in their effects are quite 
concrete in shaping empirical accounts of world politics. If the practice turn leads to a failure 
to explain the conditions of practice, this turn may in fact obfuscate more than assist in IR 
WKHRULVWV¶DWWHPSWVWRJUDSSOHZLWKFRPSOH[ZRUOGSROLWLFDOSURFHVVHV3UDFWLFHWKHory is surely 
not without its uses: it can help to enlighten some new aspects of international politics and to 
explain some aspects of the activities of world political actors and indeed IR scholars. We also 
welcome the desire among a new wave of scholars to develop a critical approach that 
challenges the conservatism of established theories including both constructivism and 
poststructuralism. $OVRWKHFULWLTXHVRIWKHSRWHQF\RIµVRFLDOVFLHQFHFULWLTXHV¶DULVLQJIURP
approaches such as ANT are important. However, in turning to sociology WKURXJKµSUDFWLFH¶ 
there is a danger of IR theorists turning to sociology with a limited sociological imagination 
that restricts our ability not only to talk about the world, but also to critique and change it. We 
argue that realist foundations can provide an important grounding for practice theory. Realist 
philosophy cano allow us to study the sociological trends and practices but can do this while 
maintaining a focus on the contexts that provide the conditions of possibility of practice. This 
leads to a richer and indeed potentially more questioning social science. Philosophical positions 
DUH QRW QHFHVVDULO\ µWUXWKV¶ ± it would be presumptuous to assume the truth of any one 
philosophical system ± but they do require engagement with because they are unavoidable in 
how we read the world and, moreover, give grounding to social analysis and political 
viewpoints. Similarly, abstractions VXFK DV µVRFLDO VWUXFWXUHV¶ DUH QRW QHFHVVDULO\ WKH µILQDO
ZRUGV¶ that we should be forever bound to, yet they too are necessary and inescapable and 
when done well, can achieve exactly what critics like Latour call for, the kind of µOLIWLQJ¶RI
our SODQHRIVLJKWIURPµZKDWDQGZKHUH we are¶.  
 
                                                          
2 Critical realism argues that social structures, unlike natural structures, do not exist independently of the 
ĂĐƚŝǀŝƚŝĞƐƚŚĞǇŐŽǀĞƌŶ ?EŽƌĂƌĞƐŽĐŝĂůƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĞƐŝŶĚĞƉĞŶĚĞŶƚŽĨĂŐĞŶƚ ?ƐĐŽŶĐĞƉƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞŝƌĂĐƚŝǀŝƚŝĞƐ ?,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?
this intentional activity may have unconscious or unintentional consequences (of structural reproduction / 
elaboration). Social structures, in contrast to natural ones, are only relatively enduring. Their existence is 
 ?ƐƉĂƚŝŽ-ƚĞŵƉŽƌĂůůǇŵŽŽƌĞĚ ?ĂŶĚ ?ŐĞŽ-ŚŝƐƚŽƌŝĐĂůůǇƌĞƉƌŽĚƵĐĞĚ ?ĚŝƐƚĂŶƚŝĂƚĞĚĂŶĚƚƌĂŶƐĨŽƌŵĞĚ ? ?ŚĂƐŬĂƌ ? ? ? ? P
175). 
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Rather than moving us away from concrete analysis, abstraction is precisely the means by 
which knowledge attempts to grasp the differentiations of the world and to individuate objects 
through characterising their main attributes and relations (Sayer 1992: 86). In particular, 
abstractions help us to identify structures, understood, according to Sayer, as sets of internally 
related objects or practices (1992: 92), and people, understood according to their positioning 
and roles within these structures and the possibilities and limitations that come with this. We 
EHOLHYHWKDWWKLVLVFRQVLVWHQWZLWK%RXUGLHX¶VDSSURDFKDQGLQGHHGZLWK0LFKDHO:LOOLDPVRQH
RIWKHIHZ,5VFKRODUVWRKDYHUHFRJQLVHGWKHFKDOOHQJHSRVHGE\WKHQHFHVVLW\µRIDEVWUDFWLRQ
moving away from the purely subjective experiences of individuals to the structural level of 
the conditions of their possibility, without losing sight of the need to reintegrate these insights 
ZLWKWKHFRQWLQXDOSUDFWLFDOFUHDWLYLW\RIDJHQWV¶:LOOLDPV 
 
While scientific and critical realism have been seen to be antithetical to the practice turn which 
has emphasised the need to µIODWWHQ¶ RQWRORJLFDO DVVXPSWLRQV DQG DYRLG SKLORVRSKLFDO
speculation, we have hoped to show practice theory need not be so. Practice theory, including 
%RXUGLHX¶VWKHRULVLQJFDQEHXQGHUVWRRGDQGDGGUHVVHGWKURXJKWKHUHDOLVWWUDGLWLRQ:HDUH
not, to clarify, insisting on practice theory and realism as long-lost sister traditions naturally 
pushing in the same direction. Rather, we argue that interpreting the insights of practice theory 
through a realist lens, and thus also recovering the realist assumptions in practice theory of 
theorists such as Bourdieu, is fruitful for how IR theorists use and engage with this theoretical 
tradition. If practice theory is a tradition it is a wide-ranging tradition, which can be built, 
augmented and morphed into divergent directions. This realist orientation, we argue, is helpful 
today for IR theorists in both identifying what is at stake in theorising practice in IR and in 
allowing a renegotiation of the nature of practice and practice theory in a way which allows for 
µELJWKHRU\¶µDEVWUDFWLRQ¶DQGFUXFLDOO\DOVRµVSHFXODWLRQ¶RQFDXVDOIRUFHVEH\RQGSUDFWLFH. 
 
Just as pragmatism is not the only solution to our problems of knowledge, philosophical realism 
may not be the only solution either. Yet, in highlighting the limits of practice vision it can be a 
positive and productive way of understanding the significance and also theorising the meaning 
of practices. Any commitments in a realist framework, or any other framework (such as 
pragmatism) should be reflexive and open-ended but, surely, as such, better than naïvely 
thinking we can face the world unhindered by philosophical or sociological problems of 
knowledge. Philosophy may not be the only solution but it is not a hindrance either; sociology 
may hold much promise but without a reflective philosophical grounding it too can result in an 
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unhelpful reproduction of limited sociological consciousness. 
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